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Husserl, Heidegger, and the Transcendental Dimension of Phenomenology 
 





Understanding phenomenology as a philosophical approach in which human-world relationships 
are analysed, as well as the constitution of subjectivity and objectivity within these relationships, 
this paper addresses some issues related to the transcendental dimension in the phenomenology of 
Edmund Husserl. An attempt is also made to re-address some issues related to phenomenology 
and its transcendental dimension as understood by adherents of hermeneutical phenomenology 
such as Paul Ricoeur. In essence, the focus of the paper is on exploring the following issues: what 
is this transcendental turn in Husserl’s philosophy? Is this an ‘unfortunate turn’ toward a neo-
Kantian brand of transcendental idealism? What is the significance of this transcendental 
dimension in Husserl’s phenomenology? Is there any distinctive phenomenological programme 
that, despite their differences, is common to both Husserl and Heidegger? This line of questioning 
proceeds from the observations made by Paul Ricoeur that, “with the development of his 
‘hermeneutics of facticity’, Heidegger rejected Husserl’s neo-Kantian brand of transcendental 
phenomenology in favour of a de-transcendental and historicized way of doing philosophy, that 
Heidegger understood the subject to be ‘factic’, in contrast to Husserl’s pure ego as the source of 
the world constitution”(Hahn, 1995). Ultimately, however, the thrust of this exploration is 
towards understanding the transcendental way of doing philosophy and the so-called historicized 
way of philosophizing as two distinct ways to reach one common goal, the transcendental 




Husserl, Heidegger, and the Transcendental 
Dimension of Phenomenology  
 
The question that is posed by Steven Crowell, and the 
question that I would like to pose, is this: is 
Heidegger’s understanding of phenomenology a 
counter position to the philosophical phenomenology 
advocated by Husserl? Can the positions of these two 
philosophers have anything in common, despite the 
primacy of consciousness and epistemology in 
Husserl, and the primacy of ontology of Being in 
Heidegger? Rather than interpreting Heidegger’s 
thinking as a radical departure from Husserl in the 
name of concrete existence (existentialism), intuitive 
non-conceptual experience (mysticism), or the 
singularity and multiplicity of life (life-philosophy), 
Crowell argues that Heidegger’s approach transforms 
rather than destroys Husserl’s basic insights about 
meaning and intentionality. In order to grasp this, we 
must look at Heidegger’s commitment to Husserl’s 
project of transcendental phenomenology in terms of 
the transcendental space of meaning. In other words, 
in Heidegger, as in Husserl, there is commitment to 
doing philosophy phenomenologically and methodo-
logically. Contrary to this view, however, some 
exponents of hermeneutical phenomenology, 
including Paul Ricoeur, hold that there are serious 
methodological differences between these two great 
exponents of phenomenology evident in their 
respective philosophical positions. In Husserl, 
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philosophy as phenomenology is a quest for the 
intentionality of the “cogito”, while in Heidegger the 
central question is the ontology of Being. 
 
Steven Crowell argues that Husserl and Heidegger are 
nevertheless both working out the transcendental 
space of meaning, which is presupposed and enacted 
in all understanding and interpretation. Against this 
background, I shall make an attempt at understanding 
why there have always been disagreements about the 
interpretation of Heidegger’s relation to the pheno-
menological tradition, and in what manner these 
differences can be minimized. In order to do this, it is 
necessary to understand both Husserl and Heidegger 
as exponents of a common phenomenological 
methodology that requires serious commitment to a 
transcendental realm of meaning. This is what I 
intend to show in this paper. I shall begin with what is 
meant by the primacy of consciousness in Husserl and 
the so-called “counter position” of Heidegger with his 
central focus on the question of Being and the 
ontological way of doing philosophy. 
 
Husserl, Heidegger, and the “Common 
Phenomenological Project” 
 
For Edmund Husserl, one of the central questions for 
philosophy is: “what it is for us to know?” - in other 
words, “what it is for us to be conscious of anything?” 
From a phenomenological perspective, this is a 
question we cannot help asking, because man is 
essentially an explorer of a transcendental realm of 
meaning. In other words, we live in meaning, and we 
live “towards”, oriented to experience. That is the 
only way we can look for the meaningful realm of 
anything, since we exist in terms of our intentional 
nature, with intentionality thus being at the heart of 
our knowing. To be aware of anything is to be 
inclined “towards something”. This phenomenolo-
gical account of our mode of being and our mode of 
knowing emerged as unique and novel, challenging 
both the empirical approach and the analytic tradition. 
The empiricist’s approach to experience and to the 
measurable content of perception relies on data that 
leaves out of account the specifically “subjective” 
dimension of consciousness: if our “immediate 
experience consists of inherently meaningless sense 
data represented in the mind” (Feenberg, 1999), there 
is no scope for accommodating other features of our 
experience, like the contemplative viewpoint. In the 
analytic tradition, with its emphasis on linguistic 
analysis and treatment of language as a system, 
experience is abstracted and translated into words: the 
content of this system may refer to things we 
experience, but it cannot deal directly with 
experience. Both these accounts of experience 
therefore fail to take us back to the lived dimension of 
reality, back to the things as they are in themselves. 
 
Husserl’s phenomenology is a proposal for an 
alternate way of looking at things. Husserl declares 
his adherence to the “given”: “to safeguard the right 
of insights, we phenomenologists are positivists” 
(quoted in Palmer, 2002). Similar pursuit of the lived 
dimension of experience in Bergson, Dilthey, and 
many other predecessors of Husserl, establishes the 
fact that there was great longing for this concrete 
dimension of life and meaning. William James 
(1904/1912) was the first ‘phenomenologist’ to 
conceptualize this lived dimension of experience 
when he defined consciousness in terms of the 
“stream of consciousness”. James argued that 
experience already contains meaning and relationship 
and thus need not obtain coherence from the synthetic 
activity of a pre-existing subject. “Experience is an 
intentional act in which the experiencer is directed to 
an experienced object. In this sense of a reference 
beyond itself, experience has essentially a minimum 
of meaning and meaningless experience is a 
contradiction in terms. It is only by the grace of the 
experiencing act that the experienced object receives 
its title of being an ‘experience’.” 
 
Husserl’s phenomenology is a continuation of this 
trend in philosophy that gives priority to the 
experiential dimension of meaning, with the power of 
intuition attaining the utmost significance in Husserl’s 
phenomenology. In this regard, Husserl considers 
himself a Cartesian philosopher. For Husserl, “it was 
Descartes rather than Kant who was the truly decisive 
thinker in modern philosophy; Kant had failed to 
fulfil even the promise of his own transcendental 
philosophy. This belated fulfilment was the aim of 
Husserl’s own transcendental phenomenology” 
(Palmer, 2002, p. 3). Kant’s own project in the 
Critique of Pure Reason requires what one might call 
transcendental psychology, that is, the study of those 
faculties that are required for us to have cognition. 
Transcendental psychology thus differs from rational 
psychology insofar as the former presupposes that we 
have experience (albeit of a very general sort), 
whereas the latter is restricted to the mere concept ‘I 
think’.  
 
Thus, it would seem that many of Kant’s most 
important claims in the Critique of Pure Reason 
would fall under the domain of transcendental 
psychology. Husserl is equally critical of Descartes 
for his failure to do full justice to the intuitive 
dimension of experience. Husserl thus modified 
Descartes’s position, introducing phenomenological 
bracketing of whatever is experienced in our engaged 
and participatory mode of experiencing in order to lay 
bare the essential structures of that deeper realm of 
subjectivity, the source of all our meaning-giving 
activity. Transcendental philosophy seeks to situate 
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itself upon a ‘higher’, transcendental plane with a 
view to bringing to light certain a priori structures 
which are supposed to account for the objectivity of 
the object. The bracketing strategy is equivalent to 
allowing experience to take its own structure or 
highlight its own meanings. This highlighting is 
essentially intuitional. 
 
Unlike in Descartes, the two realms of the knower 
and the known are no longer causally related in 
Husserl’s approach. Husserl is Cartesian in the sense 
that the object known is also an “appearance”, a 
“product in the mind”. For Husserl, however, it is 
constituted by a transcendental meaning-giving realm 
that differs from the empirical, psychological inner 
and isolated cogito of Cartesian philosophy. In order 
to reach that, one has to undergo an epoché of what is 
empirically given, of the knower “I” and the known 
“other”, with these two now organized as two distinct 
poles of the concept-making and meaning-giving 
dimension of transcendental subjectivity. “This 
requires stripping the phenomenon of its naturalistic 
interpretation, which perhaps even provides a 
misleading description with the term ‘product’, and 
then giving a ‘correct’ account of this appearing. One 
can refer to Husserl’s notion of ‘constitution’, which 
is actually a title for extensive analysis of a non-
causal relationship between the real temporal flow of 
experiences and whatever objectivities these 
experiences bring to awareness … the particular sense 
in which these conceptual entities are ‘produced’ by 
the mind has yet to be adequately described” 
(McKenna, 1991, p. 185). 
 
Mohanty (1991) observes: “The possibility lies in the 
ambiguous status of consciousness as being, on the 
one hand, an empirical domain, a part of the world 
about which there might be theories of various sorts; 
and, on the other hand, a transcendental domain and 
thereby the source of all those interpretive 
frameworks which make theories possible. The 
confusion arises in self-mundanization of transcend-
ental subjectivity by which this subjectivity 
constitutes itself as a ‘private, inner domain that is 
inserted into public, outer, nature’. This is not a 
genuine competitor to transcendental subjectivity” (p. 
199). Experience in this manner is a process in which 
the knower pole of that subjectivity, the experiencing 
concrete subject and its intuitiveness, is the field in 
which those supposedly lifeless bare sense-datums of 
empiricists also undergo transformation as “lived-
objects”, the meant and understood contents of 
experience, “the things themselves”.  
 
Feenberg (1999) points out that “In Hegel, this 
concept of experience served to eliminate the 
substantialist notion of subjectivity inherited from 
Descartes. The Hegelian subject is no cogito but a 
self-constituting process”. In the sense that experience 
takes place necessarily in the subjective space, and 
cannot take place anywhere else, phenomenological 
understanding of experience in Husserl is naturally 
within an idealist framework. This is evident in his 
phenomenological approach to the concrete and the 
lived dimension of reality. Brentano’s new 
psychology, based on an “empirical foundation”, 
takes experience in a sense which includes a certain 
ideal intuition. This is like adding specific meanings 
to experiences. Brentano substituted an intentional 
account of the intrinsic connection between subject 
and object for the usual causal account. The act of 
experiencing is part and parcel of the indubitable 
sphere of Husserl’s absolute consciousness. In 
Husserl’s transcendental idealism, according to which 
the transcendental world owes its being to the 
constituting acts of the pure ego, it is the centrality of 
the concrete dimension of transcendental subjectivity 
that is to be understood phenomenologically. 
Phenomenology thus provides a much wider scope to 
experience. Besides sense experience, it includes 
experiences of relations, meanings, values, required-
ness, and of other minds, as well as social and cultural 
phenomena. The predicative stage of judgments and 
propositions, with its polarization of subject and 
predicate, differs essentially from the unpolarized 
structure of our experience. Predicative knowledge is 
based on this. All that phenomenology can attempt is 
to clarify the essential structure of experience.  
 
If phenomenology in Husserl is a bold attempt at re-
locating both the experienced and the experiencing in 
that meaning-giving centre of transcendental 
subjectivity, experience as “ontological foundation” 
in Heidegger is also a revealer of the “always already 
present ground even of reflection itself”. This is a 
dimension of our existence and our experience that 
was familiar to philosophers like William James, 
Whitehead, and Bertrand Russell, although what it 
meant to them differed due to their adherence to 
different methodological approaches to this realm of 
meaning. Russell called this latter non-psychological 
version of pure experience a “neutral monism”. 
“Experience has a temporal pattern opening from the 
very start toward future phases and subsequently also 
to the past ones” (Russell, 1951). From Merleau-
Ponty’s body to Max Scheler’s experience of value, 
there is one basic motto: “for experience is the 
manner in which each existing perceiver lives his 
body and his world” (Feenberg, 1999). 
 
This insistence on the primacy of experience is 
common to both Husserl and Heidegger - which, 
when all is said and done, is something we have in 
support of their common phenomenological 
programme. We would, however, have to re-define 
certain other words such as “theory” and “praxis”, or 
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else we will enter into a debate as to whether 
philosophy as phenomenology is a way of life, or 
praxis, as opposed to philosophy as Sophia, a 
theoretical quest and love of wonder for the sake of 
wondering. This is the perspective that made 
Heidegger’s hermeneutics a counter position to 
Husserl’s philosophy as essentially theoretical. But is 
that really so? We can identify Husserl’s way of 
doing philosophy as theory-centric and Heidegger’s 
as praxis-centric only if praxis refers to what we 
actually do in life and how we make sense of that. 
However, if phenomenology deals with experience 
uninterrupted but allows it to take the form which is 
built into it, then phenomenology in Husserl can be 
practical and ontology in Heidegger can be 
theoretical. Experience is not limited to what is not 
practical but includes any experience. It would be a 
completely different matter if Husserl had 
misunderstood Heidegger’s phenomenological 
concern as purely “ontological” and anthropological; 
for Heidegger, however, these are not just existential 
or anthropological concerns. He believes his position 
to be phenomenological, a phenomenology of ‘care’. 
With more emphasis on structure and on 
methodological concerns than on the historical 
manner of accepting pre-conceptions, Husserl became 
apprehensive of Heidegger’s sole emphasis on the 
interpretive approach to the question of man’s Being 
unaided by reflection and a critical stance. For 
Husserl, it was not sufficient to have a “basic 
experience” to communicate. This could lead to a 
distortion of experience - avoiding which was 
Husserl’s reason for his phenomenological method, as 
it is a method that, in practice, leaves experience 
unfettered by theory, prejudice, and so forth. 
 
The tension between these two conceptions of the 
method of philosophy - the one leaping into involved 
concern, the other maintaining a detached reserve - is 
resolved in a phenomenological manner in both the 
philosophy of Husserl and the ontology of Heidegger. 
There is phenomenological reduction in Husserl from 
facts to essence, and in Heidegger from beings to 
Being and to meaning of Being. Just as there is 
centrality of “life world” concerns in Husserl’s 
theory-centric phenomenology, Heidegger’s praxis-
centric manipulator man has equivalent distance to 
that of the poet and the mystic from the average 
everydayness. Philosophy is still a primal science for 
Heidegger that uncovers the a priori categories of 
factic life. With his concern for avoiding a philosophy 
of consciousness that leads to the solitariness of a 
disembodied cogito, Heidegger substitutes a broader 
conception of Dasein as a finite being-in-the-world. 
In this way, Heidegger thus exhibits equal concern for 
restoring the experiential and the lived dimension of 
meaning, of meaning of Being, but in a language that 
is different from Husserl’s. Husserl did not part with 
the language of consciousness, although he sought to 
re-define it, purging it of its psychological and 
mentalist connotations. Husserl believed that 
phenomenological bracketing would purify the 
language of psychologism. The question remains: did 
he succeed in doing that? 
 
Heidegger opted for a radical break with the 
traditional use of consciousness-centric descriptions 
of experience. It would be a different matter again if 
Heidegger had actually succeeded in creating a new 
language that he hoped would keep room for re-
defining the notion of experience, stripping it of the 
reference to its usual subjectivistic aspect. “Facticity 
becomes ontologically important as a finite subject is 
essentially in the world, in a time and place, acting 
out of its concerns (Sorge). These determinations 
become ontologically general once they describe the 
special type of being to which being is revealed, and 
not a mere thing, e.g. the human animal. 
Consciousness is no longer the essence of 
subjectivity. More fundamental than consciousness is 
the ‘circumspection’ (Umsicht) with which Dasein 
moves amidst its objects and grasps them in action” 
(Feenberg, 1999). This “non-mentalistic revision of 
the concept of experience” is evident in his attempt at 
re-defining so much a subject-centric term like 
“mineness” (Jemeinigkeit) “as an existentiale, a 
structure of being-in-the-world” (ibid.). 
 
Andrew Feenberg (1999) gives a beautiful description 
of Heidegger’s unsuccessful but desperate attempt to 
come out of the subjectivistic conception of 
phenomenology. Making a comparative study of 
Heidegger’s and Nishida’s paths “to the things 
themselves”, he asks: “But again, what is the status of 
such structures? Are they Kantian transcendental 
conditions? The Kantian interpretation brings back 
the whole subject/object paradigm Heidegger is 
attempting to escape. In Heidegger’s language it is. 
With an eye on the parallel problem in Nishida’s 
retreat from the concept of experience, I would 
suggest that we understand ‘mineness’ as the 
irreducibility of first personhood, the fact that it 
cannot be dissolved into objective determinations, 
that it is not present-at-hand like ordinary things.” 
Unlike in Kant, and like in Husserl, Heidegger could 
not avoid making reference to a transcendental 
dimension and a non-reductive noumena that can be 
experienced in its otherness. These he called 
“existentials”, that a priori realm of experience, the 
non-reductive realm of “existential analytic”. 
Interestingly, these analytics acquire value as they are 
situated in the human context, inferring that meaning 
must be created by people if it is to exist at all. This 
phenomenological insistence on establishing meaning 
at the personal level of human existence is a key to 
the human dimension, and therefore the ethical 
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dimension, of Husserl’s thought and also of 
Heidegger’s thought.  
 
Paul Tillich (1951) described the issue this way: 
“This approach [Heidegger’s method in Being and 
Time] must, however, be protected against a 
fundamental misunderstanding. It in no way assumes 
that man [sic] is more easily accessible as an object of 
knowledge, physical or psychological, than are non-
human objects. Just the contrary is asserted. Man is 
the most difficult object encountered in the cognitive 
process. The point is that man is aware of the 
structures which make cognition possible. He lives in 
them and acts through them. They are immediately 
present to him. They are he himself” (quoted in 
Hunter, 2004). Man is essentially a contemplator and 
also a manipulator. Both theory and practice become 
indistinguishable in one existential being, the human 
Dasein, the embodied, destiny-stricken man for whom 
his own life is itself a mystery that is beyond his 
grasp. For Husserl, it is the most wonderful and the 
most striking realization of his phenomenology that 
complete reduction is an impossible dream, that man 
is both one who knows, and the one who knows that 
he does not know! “(E)ven though Husserl the 
founder of phenomenology ‘was wedded to his 
terminology of ‘transcendental idealism’,’ in his 
philosophy the concept of ‘constitution’ has a central 
place. Human ‘intuitions’ of reality are constituted, 
not given. And Merleau-Ponty ‘claimed that the 
implication of phenomenology was not 
transcendental, with all the hubris of a total and self-
contained system, but existential’“ (Verbeek, 2003, p. 
2, citing Idhe, 1999).  
 
“In line with the ‘edifying’ character of contemporary 
continental philosophy, it can be elaborated that, 
within these human-world relationships, both the 
objectivity of the world and the subjectivity of those 
who are experiencing and existing in it are 
constituted. Our world is ‘interpreted reality’ and our 
existence is ‘situated subjectivity’. What the world 
‘is’, and what subjects ‘are’, arises from the interplay 
between humans and reality” (Verbeek, 2003, p. 3).  
 
The central issue of current research into Heidegger’s 
early thought is whether, and to what degree, 
Heidegger remained committed to the transcendental 
philosophy of his teachers - Husserl, Lask, and 
Rickert. A principal direction of Heidegger’s thought, 
formulated in his doctrine of care, is the claim that 
this alienation can only be overcome through active 
involvement in finite concerns. In Being and Time 
(1927), Heidegger footnotes his claim that his own 
phenomenological investigation “would not have 
been possible if the ground had not been prepared by 
Husserl, with whose Logische Untersuchungen 
phenomenology first emerged”, by adding that, “if 
Being and Time has taken any steps forward in 
disclosing the ‘things themselves’, the author must 
first of all thank E. Husserl, who, by providing his 
own incisive personal guidance and by freely turning 
over his unpublished investigations, familiarized the 
author with the most diverse areas of 
phenomenological research during his student years 
in Freiburg” (quoted in Feenberg, 1999). During these 
years of 1919-1923, Husserl spoke of his assistant as 
his “favourite student” and the “phenomenological 
child”, even saying to Heidegger that “You and I are 
phenomenology”. And, in 1923, Heidegger seems to 
accept this position when he writes, “Husserl gave me 
his eyes.” But, as Van Buren notes, whereas 
Heidegger’s doctoral dissertation had been “for the 
most part” an “uncritical appropriation” of Husserl’s 
position, by 1925 Heidegger was presenting his own 
lecture course which “eventually became ‘Division 
One’ and the first third of ‘Division Two’ of Being 
and Time as a ‘fundamental critique of 
phenomenological inquiry’“ (Van Buren, quoted in 
Feenberg, 1999). 
 
Transcendental Subjectivity and its Critics 
 
Michael Dummett (1978) feels that it is a serious 
drawback of phenomenology that it was unable to 
take the “linguistic turn” and as such remained at the 
level of a style of thinking, a cluster of relatively 
independent voices. Phenomenology therefore could 
not attain the dignified status of a viable research 
programme. Contrary to these claims of Dummett, 
phenomenology, as Ricoeur understands it, differs 
from mere aestheticism, a view that philosophy is a 
loose tradition that can be interpreted as ‘an art of 
living’, “as exemplified in the lives of Nietzsche, 
Foucault and others” (Dummett, 1978). For Husserl, 
philosophy is not a continuation of other sciences, but 
is autonomous in the sense that it does not borrow its 
premises from other cognitive domains, such as 
history, physics, psychology and so on, as an aesthetic 
position is entitled to do. One can say that the 
hermeneutical turn in phenomenology is not a break 
with Husserl’s prime objective of safeguarding a non-
reductive approach to consciousness study, although 
interpretations differ regarding the proper description 
of that transcendental domain. Ricoeur understands 
his own hermeneutical turn and the factical turn in 
Heidegger as continuations of the philosophy of 
intentionality, and, as such, as diverse attempts at 
liberating Husserl’s phenomenology from its unholy 
association with a kind of Neo-Kantian brand of 
subjective idealism.  
 
From Ricoeur’s understanding of this unfortunate 
transcendental turn in Husserl’s phenomenological 
position, one can identify Heidegger’s own 
“ontological phenomenology” in Being and Time as a 
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“more radical internal development” of Husserlian 
phenomenology, which turns on what Heidegger calls 
the “working out of the hermeneutical situation” 
(Hahn, 1995). Differing from the contemplator man 
of transcendental phenomenology, Heidegger’s 
Dasein exists hermeneutically. “It is to participate in 
the endless chain of interpretation that makes up the 
history of apprehending being. Says Heidegger, one 
enters into dialogue with the doctrines of past 
thinkers, which were ‘in turn learned by listening to 
the great thinkers’ thinking.’ One participates in the 
endless chain of listening that constitutes essential 
thinking. ‘Each human being is in each instance in 
dialogue with its forbears and perhaps even more and 
in a more hidden manner with those who will come 
after it’“ (Palmer, 1980, quoting Heidegger, 1959/ 
1971, pp. 40 & 135).  
 
The tension between these two conceptions of the 
method of philosophy - the one leaping into involved 
concern, the other maintaining a detached reserve - 
could lead to the positing of the being-centric 
phenomenology espoused by Heidegger against the 
consciousness-centric phenomenology of Husserl. 
They both, however, have claimed to be doing it for 
the sake of safeguarding the human and spiritual 
dimensions of life, and to be doing it 
phenomenologically. My question to the critics of 
transcendental subjectivity in Husserl is: can there be 
a rejection of the meaning-giving transcendental 
realm, the so-called consciousness-centric transcend-
ental subjectivity that Husserl was so keen to 
safeguard, without at the same time compromising 
one’s claim to be doing philosophy phenomeno-
logically? If phenomenology is a novel way to look at 
phenomena and at noumena such that they become 
one and indistinguishable, “the thing experienced”, 
both these philosophers have placed a renewed value 
on the thing as it is encountered in actual experience. 
This indeed is a personal encounter between two 
distinct individualities, the one which appears in its 
own distinct manner of appearing, the “thing itself”, 
and the appearance that cannot be completely 
unveiled by any human observer and his usual 
subject-object relational mode of knowing. Husserl’s 
scheme of transcendental subjectivity is a proposal for 
transcending the limitations of empirical and 
psychological subjectivity, the inner, disembodied 
cogito of Cartesian philosophy and its counterpart, its 
transcendent “other”, in order to re-define 
consciousness as the universal means to our having 
the world. In short, consciousness, through capacities 
intrinsic to it, is interpretive, and the meaning-
bestowing realm. For Husserl, the transcendental ego 
functions as the philosophically necessary anchor of 
his phenomenology. The study of the “constitution of 
the world”  involves tracing the genesis of meanings 
to their last origin, which is transcendental 
consciousness. 
 
Why is this meaning-giving realm of transcendental 
subjectivity so crucial for Husserl’s way of doing 
phenomenology - and why, on the other hand, are 
critics so allergic to the notion of a consciousness-
centric meaning-giving realm? To be more specific, 
what are the motives for this rejection of Husserl’s 
brand of transcendental subjectivity? Why was 
Husserl so determined to keep it as part of his 
philosophy? What were his motivations? It would 
seem that the critics feared that this centrality of the 
subject-centric transcendental realm of meaning is an 
unfortunate lapse into the language of the subject-
centric neo-Kantian brand of transcendental idealism, 
and that it permits those “unknown and unknowable” 
metaphysical entities “back door entry” to the 
prestigious academy of philosophy. After two world 
wars, philosophers have been sceptical about anything 
that dealt with anything except the world we have to 
live in. The spiritual in culture had failed and the 
transcendental had all the vagueness of the spiritual. 
Can we say that, like all European philosophy, 
phenomenology too has been Americanized  -  which 
is to say, re-thought by philosophers who retain the 
basic pragmatism of their culture, which is not all that 
sympathetic to ideas like the transcendental? 
 
I feel that Husserl was strongly motivated to keep this 
part of his philosophy when there was a strong urge in 
him to address the context of the anonymous 
alienation brought about by a technological mass 
society. “Husserl made the relevance of the questions 
that are decisive for a genuine humanity a central 
issue within phenomenology. In the Crisis and the 
Vienna Lecture, Husserl turned from the formal 
structure of consciousness as noesis/noema to the idea 
of the spiritual becoming of European humanity. The 
fruit of his close theoretical work in these statements 
indicate how a concern for ethical renewal was a 
theme in Husserl’s work, but this social concern was 
arrived at on the basis of a doctrine of philosophy as 
grounded in transcendental consciousness, with which 
Heidegger fundamentally disagreed” (Feenberg, 
1999). For both Husserl and Heidegger, the basic 
concern of phenomenology is to restore the world in 
all of its concreteness as against all cognitive 
representations. Husserl’s talk about a transcendental 
dimension of meaning is his maiden attempt to grasp 
the first person standpoint from the first person 
standpoint itself, an attempt which leads to its 
depersonalization and identification with the given in 
its givenness.  
 
For Heidegger, too, “first personhood loses the 
character of a present-at-hand thing in the world and 
becomes a horizon that cannot be directly thematized. 
All experience, including the experienced self, falls 
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under that horizon, which is ‘nothing’ insofar as it is 
not a being in the world, not a cogito, but a field of 
appearance in something like Husserl’s sense”. It was 
Husserl’s firm conviction that the intentionality of 
consciousness is the foundational ground of 
philosophy. For Husserl, resources to transform are 
within us, but our pure look lies not in participation, 
but in storing that energy for re-building. For 
Heidegger, the modern world view is “the gnawing of 
an empty scepticism”, and “presupposes not too much 
but too little”. It arises when “we take our departure 
from a wordless ‘I’ in order to provide this ‘I’ with an 
Object” (Feenberg, 1999). Ultimately, Heidegger re-
discovered the spiritual root of this alienated 
worldless Dasein not in uncritical commitments to 
presuppositions of worldly Daseins, but in the 
realization that authenticity emerges in the openness 
of the individual to his own being. Otherwise 
philosophy will lose its intuitive and reflective grip on 
experiencing one’s own mode of being and it will be 
like any other way of looking at life, a world view, a 
cultural and anthropological way of defining the 
meaning of situated and existential Daseins. Or else, 
there will be recognition of an essential and a spiritual 
dimension of meaning, but, as the ‘noumenal other’, 
beyond the grasp of the destiny-stricken man of the 
world who is torn between the two worlds, the actual, 
and the ideal. Attending with “unerring seriousness” 
to the “thematic meaning of the transcendental mode 
of inquiry”, Husserl tells us that the “transcendental 
ego is clearly different from the natural human ego 
yet is anything but second, something separate from 
it; this is necessary in order to avoid transcendental 
psychologism” (Palmer, 2002). 
 
Paul Ricoeur justifies Heidegger’s rejection of 
transcendental subjectivity in Husserl’s phenomeno-
logy, identifying it as a neo-Kantian brand of 
transcendental idealism. Interestingly, Husserl offered 
his own justification for why he was resistant to the 
claim to apodicticity made by the Cartesian cogito 
and Kantian “I think”. Ricoeur introduced Husserl’s 
phenomenology to the French audience largely in the 
way he understood and appreciated Husserlian 
phenomenology. Ricoeur distinguishes, in Husserl’s 
presentation of the phenomenological reduction, the 
competition between two ways of approaching the 
phenomenality of the phenomenon. “According to the 
first, ratified by Max Scheler, Ingarden, and other 
phenomenologists of the time of the Logical 
Investigations, the reduction made the appearing as 
such of any phenomenon stand out more sharply; 
according to the second, which was adopted by 
Husserl himself and encouraged by Eugen Fink, the 
reduction made possible the quasi-Fichtean 
production of phenomenality by pure consciousness, 
which set itself up as the source of all appearing, 
more original than any received externality” (Hahn, 
1995). Ricoeur has preferred to carefully respect the 
rights of the realist interpretation with a resistance to 
the orthodox interpretation of phenomenological 
reduction. 
 
Husserl wanted to advocate a kind of transcendental 
psychology about which many had no idea as to what 
it implied, although there are always a handful of 
thinkers for whom it makes sense to identify it as a 
realm of meaning that transcends the language of both 
realism and idealism. That way, one may find a close 
similarity between Edmund Husserl’s account of 
transcendental experience and Eastern insights into 
experience, insofar as both need a language that 
transcends the subject-object dichotomies. Most 
would be reluctant to go down that path, because it is 
so alien to the contemporary philosophic, scientific 
(not entirely) and political culture on which 
globalization is founded and which governs all or 
most of our academic pursuits. Maintaining a safe 
distance from a self-conscious cogito that could be 
immediately grasped, Ricoeur makes a selective 
assimilation of Husserl’s phenomenological 
methodology with his own brand of hermeneutic 
phenomenology. Ricoeur is one of the forerunners of 
the main representatives of this movement, along with 
Heidegger and Gadamer, for whom phenomenology 
becomes hermeneutical when its method is taken to 
be interpretive (rather than purely descriptive as in 
transcendental phenomenology). Ricoeur understands 
the hermeneutical turn in Husserl’s phenomenology 
as a natural outcome of Husserl’s phenomenological 
movement that kept room for a continuous 
development from the notion of intentionality to that 
of being-in-the-world. Ricoeur is drawn to a kind of 
hermeneutical phenomenology and its sole business 
of expressing a definite task, “the task of 
interpreting”.  
 
Ricoeur interprets hermeneutics as the “learned word” 
for the task of interpretation. Hermeneutical 
interpretation is suspicious of any claim made for the 
primacy of immediacy. He accordingly defines 
hermeneutics in negative terms as a “mourning of the 
immediate”. Hermeneutical phenomenology begins 
parting with the projects of intuitionist philosophy 
either in the tradition of Platonism, neo-Platonism, or 
in some aspects of phenomenology that make this 
intuitionist claim in the tradition of Descartes, “as 
though we could be without distance to ourselves”. 
The task of hermeneutics is the explication of all the 
symbolic structures that relate us indirectly to reality. 
Despite these differences, Ricoeur understands 
hermeneutics to be a continuation of Husserl’s 
phenomenology. For him, there is no real opposition 
between the two. It appears that hermeneutics tries to 
establish a link between experience and language and 
does not rely on the structure of language in an 
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“To exist hermeneutically as a human being is to exist 
intertextually. It is to participate in the endless chain 
of interpretation that makes up the history of 
apprehending being” (Palmer, 1980). This orientation 
is evident in the work of Heidegger, who argues that 
all description is always already interpretation. Every 
form of human awareness is interpretive. Especially 
in Heidegger’s later work, he increasingly introduces 
poetry and art as expressive works for interpreting the 
nature of truth, language, thinking, dwelling, and 
being. Steven Crowell reads Heidegger’s explicit 
criticism of Husserl against the background of his 
implicit dependence on him: “For instance, 
Heidegger’s rejection of Husserl’s ‘theoretism’ 
conceals his dependence on Husserl’s idea that 
phenomenology is not a theory but reflective 
clarification. One should always read Husserl’s 
explicit criticism of Heidegger against the 
background of his own megalomania: since 
Heidegger refused to be Husserl’s disciple, he could 
only be ‘anti-scientific’, ‘anthropological’, not a 
phenomenologist at all.” Crowell continues: “What is 
subjectivity for Husserl? The non-criteriological 
presence-to-self that characterizes the first person 
stance is just as much the non-criteriological presence 
-of-world. The priority of subjectivity is ethical” 
(Crowell, 2001).  
 
Crowell believes that Husserl introduced this 
dimension in terms of transcendental subjectivity, but 
this appeal to subjectivity no more distorts the 
transcendental realm than an appeal to being does. 
For Husserl, the real motivation for the reduction and 
the real priority of the irreducibly first person 
perspective (subjectivity) is ethical: because an 
autonomous philosophy is the solitary and radical 
self-responsibility of the one who is philosophizing. 
There is a lot in Husserl which sounds meditative. 
Reduction leads to this dimension of solitary self-
reflection. Husserl used traditional concepts from 
psychology, and the feud with Heidegger is the price 
paid for that linguistic practice. Through reduction, a 
transcendental dimension is achieved that differs 
completely from all psychology. This emphasis is on 
a certain change of focus, from the objects perceived 
to the ways in which the object is consciously known/ 
perceived/imagined and so on. Husserl puts the term 
“subjective ways” in scare quotes to the extent that it 
is clear that phenomenological reflection is not 
introspection, that solitary reflection is not a turning 
away from the object to the inner ghost in the 
machine. As a philosopher, Heidegger takes the 
phenomenological reduction at Husserl’s word. The 
reduction reveals that transcendental realm for 
Heidegger as well. The mode of being human, 
Dasein, is totally different from all other entities, 
since “it harbours within itself the possibility of 
transcendental constitution”. The “concrete human 
being”, as understood under the reduction of 
naturalism, can accomplish this without falling victim 
to the paradox that a “piece” of the world constitutes 
the whole world precisely because it is not a piece of 
the world: “the human being is never merely present-
at-hand, but exists”. The fact that Heidegger still used 
the term “human being” implied for Husserl that he 
had reduced the transcendental dimension of pheno-
menology to the ontic dimension of anthropology. 
 
But in what sense do the two egos of Husserl differ? 
The mode of being of this absolute ego is in some 
sense also the same as the ever-factical “I”, but in 
what sense? Dermot Moran (2000) finds it difficult to 
understand in what sense the two differ: is it only our 
different ways of regarding the one and the same ego? 
For Husserl, regional ontology takes into account the 
contingency of the human being, allowing for a 
distinction to be made between the notion that man 
can be defined only historically, and the concern of 
the methodological philosopher with Dasein as the 
site of disclosure, as “human being” neutrally 
understood within its own realm of transcendental 
dimension. For Husserl, Heidegger’s Dasein was 
anthropos, the object of the worldly sciences of man. 
Crowell comments: “But being-in-the world is no 
more in the world in that sense than is Husserl’s 
ambiguously described transcendental subjectivity 
with its ‘mundanizing self-apperception’ by which it 
also, in a manner of speaking, becomes part of the 
world. Yet when Heidegger implies that Husserl’s 
transcendental subject is still too Cartesian - that it is 
‘subjective’ in the sense that it ‘loses the world’ - he 
too is mistaken. The charge does hold true of the kind 
of psyche that emerges from the parallel abstraction, 
but the transcendental subject is not a ‘subject’ in that 
sense and cannot, as I have tried to show, be reached 
by way of it” (Crowell, 2001). Crowell justifies his 
claim that Heidegger introduced the factic subject to 
undermine the claim that there can be no 
philosophical, but only empirical-psychological, 
inquiry into concrete subjectivity, by arguing that 
Heidegger is able to do so while remaining within the 
framework of transcendental philosophy only because 
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